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Abstract: 
 
In “The Locations of Homophobia,” Rahul Rao (2014, 174-175) invites us to complicate our examination 
of homophobia by turning our analysis inwardly. Whilst I maintain the bearing of the sexed (read: 
homophobic) colonial legacies on the contemporary discourse surrounding sexuality, including 
homophobia, across much of the MENA region, I agree with Rao on the importance of turning our analytic 
gaze inwardly in order to account for the agency of “local actors” in sustaining homophobic narratives and 
practices. Three concrete location(s) of homophobia are identified in this paper: the role of the Lebanese 
ruling-class elite in the neo-liberalisation (read: depoliticization through economization) of same-sex 
desire, the alien rhetoric of local LGBT activism, and the “fractal orientalism” (Moussawi 2013) that 
reproduces Beirut as an LGBT haven. I conceptualize the “reluctant queer” in relation to each in order to 
challenge mainstream global media’s depictions of Lebanon as exceptionally LGBT-friendly, particularly 
where LGBT activism is concerned.  
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12 A number of western media outlets have recently celebrated the appointment of four women in Lebanon’s 
newly-formed government. For Reuters news agency, their appointment “[prises] open a wider foothold 
for women,” (McDowall 2019) whilst Bustle and Euronews (Lyons 2019) termed it a “huge step forward.” 
None of these outlets relate the connectivity of these women to strong sectarian leaders, or the fact that 
their appointment takes place within an unprecedented climate of homophobic rhetoric, largely 
promulgated by religious authorities. The current developments in the Lebanese ministerial cabinet are 
best described as homophobic state feminism. This paradox is telling of thinking through gender and 
sexuality dynamics in the MENA within a framework that recognizes their production “within the context 
of regional and global political economy,” as Mayssoun Sukarieh (2015, 2) rightly points out. In addition, 
and although this paper is primarily concerned with conceptualizing the “reluctant queer” in Lebanon, an 
all-encompassing expression that captures the apathetic stance of those directly concerned with LGBT 
issues, I find it important to encapsulate in my analysis “the ways in which multiple and often contradictory 
gender roles” are deployed across “different social classes, geographical sites and institutional locations” 
and “in specific institutional and ideological contexts” by each of the state and the elite (Ibid., 3). 
Conversely, and in order to best capture queer reluctance in the context of Lebanon, as opposed to its 
widely publicized image as an LGBT haven in the MENA region, it is important to instil a multi-layered 
analysis that joins the local with the global, and vice versa, and takes into account the multiplicity of the 
actors, both political and non-political ones, involved.  
 
In “The Locations of Homophobia,” Rahul Rao (2014, 174-175) invites us to complicate our analysis of 
homophobia by turning it inwardly. Whilst I maintain the bearing of the sexed colonial legacies on 
contemporary sexuality discourses, including homophobia, across much of the MENA region (see: 
Najmabadi 2005; Amer 2009; Traub 2008; Hayes 2018), I agree with Rao on the importance of turning 
our analytic gaze inwardly in order to account for the “agency” of local actors in sustaining homophobic 
narratives and practices. 
 
The concrete location(s) of homophobia in Lebanon allow me to conceive the “reluctant queer.” The 
“reluctant queer” does not mobilize in the name of LGBT rights, despite self-identifying as queer. At the 
same time, the “reluctant queer” is not to be mistaken with Men who have Sex with Men (MSM), as Joseph 
Massad (2002) would argue, nor should they1 be reduced to the question of “coming out” (see: Ritchie 
2010). Instead, the political ambivalence of the “reluctant queer” echoes Sara Ahmed’s (2000) “stranger 
fetishism,” where the stranger is “produced, not as that which we fail to recognise, but as that which we 
have already recognised as ‘a stranger’” (Ahmed 2000, 3-4). Having said that, I hope to challenge 
mainstream global media’s depictions of Lebanon as exceptionally LGBT-friendly, particularly where 
LGBT activism is concerned. 
 
In order to achieve this, I postulate the limits of the either/or deployment of Jasbir Puar’s concept of 
homonationalism in global politics, whereby certain states are reproduced as rogue and under-developed, 
whilst others are treated as enlightened and fully developed. At a second stage, I situate the “reluctant 
queer” in relation to Lebanese state and society. Three concrete location(s) of homophobia are identified 
here: the role of the Lebanese ruling-class elite in the neo-liberalisation (read: depoliticization through 
                                                 
1 I use the pronoun they in singular when writing on the reluctant queer.  
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13 economization) of same-sex desire, the alien rhetoric of local LGBT activism, and the “fractal orientalism” 
(Moussawi 2013) that reproduces Beirut as an LGBT haven. 
 
 
Methodological and Theoretical Underpinnings 
 
Queer theorists have provided important clues in their examination of sexuality, and the work of Michel 
Foucault have proved indispensable to their endeavours. Foucault (1978) sought to work out the 
discursive formation of sexuality; that is, the becoming of sexuality as a politically-charged and thus 
implicating category to be known, documented, recorded, and diagnosed. Inherent to his work is the dual 
mechanism of power: whereas certain sexualities are endorsed and sanctified, others are excluded. 
However, and as Buchanan (2018, 394) reminds us, “it is not the fact that straight is included and queer 
is excluded by a given society that concerns Foucault, but rather the fact that the elastic continuum of 
sexuality can be segmented so neatly despite the obvious permeability of the key categories.” Either way, 
critical feminist scholars have previously condemned Foucault for his “gender blindness” (King 2004), and 
for conceiving “docile bodies” – instead of subjects – as the most likely outcome of his power/knowledge 
analytic. Nancy Hartsock (1990, 164), for instance, asks: 
 
Why is it that just at the moment when so many of us who have been silenced begin to demand 
the right to name ourselves, to act as subjects rather than objects of history, that just then the 
concept of subjecthood becomes problematic? 
 
Today, four decades separate us from the work of Foucault. An additional layer of analysis at the global 
level is indispensable at a time when sexuality, notably homonationalism, is increasingly mobilized in 
foreign policy. For postcolonial2 societies, local mobilizations for or against specific political claims, 
including sexuality, cannot be fathomed within the dichotomous analytical framework set forth by 
mainstream political analysts. The latter reinforces a rest of the world vs. a seemingly monolithic west 
binary by drawing clear cuts between cosmopolitan and communitarian views. Rahul Rao (2010) shows 
the limited reach of such analysis and invites us to privilege state-society relations, despite their 
messiness, in our examination of political mobilization in Third World3 contexts. I turn to Rao’s work 
because it helps me to conceptualize the queer vis-à-vis Lebanese state and society. 
 
Mainstream political analysis distinguishes between cosmopolitan and communitarian views in its 
examination of protest in Third Worldist states. Whereas the first locates threat at the heart of the Third 
Wordlist state and turns to the international community “for rescue,” the second views the International as 
“a predatory neo-imperialist realm against which the domestic must defend itself” (Rao 2010, 7). The crux 
of Rao’s analysis, however, is that neither the cosmopolitan nor the communitarian views are 
                                                 
2 By postcolonial, I do not mean the end of colonial rule as such. Rather, I deploy postcoloniality as a condition that 
depicts physically decolonized, yet “ideologically still colonized” societies, in line with Robert J. C. Young (2009). 
3 I use the expression Third World as conceived by Rahul Rao (2010). Far from implying conventional socio-
economic criteria, the Third World state, according to Rao, invokes specific “state-society relations.” Rao (2010, 
28) draws on the work of Mohammed Ayoob who highlight Third World’s states’ “relatively late entry as full 
members into a society of juridically sovereign states” and “the incompleteness of their state- and nation-building 
process.” 
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14 ideologically-deployed as such. Rather, they manifest in conjunction with and depending on the threat in 
question, more precisely its location: inside or outside the boundaries of the Third Wordlist state. In Rao’s 
words (2010, 192): 
 
The quest for self-determination has entailed a struggle against both homophobia within their 
[Third World queer activists] communities as well as salvation by international or white LGBT 
allies. In part what these activists have been trying to say to their purported rescuers is that they 
are not just gay, but other things as well – Palestinian, Arab, Muslim [for example] and that gay 
liberation that does not respect those other identities is not liberation at all.  
 
In the Middle East, the messiness of the “quest for self-determination” can be summed up in the “Joseph 
Massad debate.” Briefly put, Massad (2002) argues that privileged western LGBT activist groups, which 
he terms “Gay International,” function as an “imperialist” (Massad 2002, 383) group that forces a 
hegemonic conception of sexuality on the Middle East and further non-western context. Instead, Massad 
(2015, 219) posits sexuality as “a Euro-American ‘cultural’ category that is not universal or necessarily 
universalizable.” Massad was widely criticized for essentializing the Arab LGBT experience and reducing 
it to an either/or western/imperialist/global or local, and for dismissing the multitude of experiences and 
sexual identities that shape LGBT activism in the region. 
 
 
Homonationalism and the “War on Terror” 
 
Jasbir Puar conceptualizes homonationalism as a framework for “understanding the complexities of how 
‘acceptance’ and ‘tolerance’ for gay and lesbian subjects have become a barometer by which the right to 
and capacity for national sovereignty is evaluated” (Puar 2013, 336). Homonationalism relocates 
homophobia from US heteronormative administration and citizens onto foreign others, notably brown and 
Muslim bodies (see: El-Tayeb 2012). The entanglement of sexuality with the US nation produces 
assemblages of unequal citizens, some more respectable than others. This newly incorporated 
homosexuality, post 9/11 following Puar, is dependent upon the ethnic and racialized demarcation of 
newly-designated, allegedly homophobic Muslim others. 
 
In addition, Puar draws parallels between modernity and homonationalism by viewing them as historical 
processes with enduring impact(s): “Like modernity, homonationalism can be resisted and re-signified, 
but not opted out of: we are all conditioned by it and through it” (Puar 2013, 337). Indeed, postcolonial 
modernities, including Middle Eastern modernities, emerged alongside discursive practices that produced 
superior powers, and inferior Others simultaneously. Puar’s attention to the question of time in her framing 
of homonationalism posits it as a paradigm shift, and like all paradigm shifts, it requires us to rethink and 
fine tune our research methodologies. Where international politics are concerned, we are compelled to 
take into consideration the “constitutive and fundamental reorientation of the relationship between the 
state, capitalism, and sexuality,” which is largely marked by “the entrance of (some) homosexual bodies 
as worthy of protection by nation-states” (Puar 2013, 337). 
 
Puar’s understanding of homonationalism as a “facet of modernity” is re-asserted by Rahul Rao (2015), 
who captures similar paradigms in the context of the global economy. Rao presents his argument as a 
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15 puzzle to the reader by asking: “why [have] leading institutions of global capitalism begun to take activist 
stances against homophobia, and why they have done so now?” (Rao 2015, 38). As is the case with Puar, 
Rao’s interrogation reflects a preoccupation with the question of time. Ultimately, Rao successfully shows 
how the portrayal of homophobia as “merely cultural” allows global and international financial bodies to 
“obscure… their own culpability in co-producing those [homophobic instances] in the first place” (Ibid.). 
Both Puar and Rao’s observations reflect the “centrality” and “mobilization” of queer sexualities in foreign 
policy (Richter-Montpetit and Weber 2017, 19). 
 
Homonationalism describes how the civilizational status of a state is defined through its treatment of its 
gay and lesbian population. It is a dual exercise of coercion and self-absolving that can be observed in 
the context of states and international politics. States that show hostility or use violence against gay and 
lesbian individuals are systematically vilified, along with their population. Such a reading of sexuality 
organizes states along a binary of good states/rogue states. Crucially, it paves the way for interventionist 
initiatives, be them in military form, as was the case of Afghanistan.4 
 
Homonationalism is a hasty fix that is riddled with epistemic censorships and inconsistencies. For one, it 
annihilates the well-documented homophobic attitude of the US government towards its non-“normal 
homosexual” politicized population. In addition, it implies that LGBT individuals currently residing in the 
US face no structural or social discrimination, which is not the case for those underprivileged LGBT 
individuals, notably LGBT people of color (Chávez 2013). Last but not least, and perhaps most 
importantly, homonationalism constructs homophobia as a fixed pattern that can easily be reversed 
through legislative measures. Homonationalism tackles gay rights in a rather instrumental fashion. Its 
Eurocentric core is reflected in its formulation of the legal sphere as independent from all other spheres 
in society. This approach is not necessarily applicable to contexts where penal codes often intertwine with 
further regulatory systems, including religion, customs, traditions, and kin-based patterns of governance 
(see: Hajjar 2004; Moghadam 2003; Brown 2009). This is not to say that the legal sphere lacks integrity 
in these contexts; rather, by overlooking their “strangeness” and hybridity, we risk annihilating local 
knowledges through the imposition of an alien legal rhetoric. Lebanon’s penal code, for instance, can be 
said to mirror its societal threefold “flexible morality,” which operates under distinct social, political-
sectarian, and religious rubrics (Deeb and Harb 2015). Where Article 534 is concerned, its legal ambiguity, 
as I show hereafter, allows the state to deploy its sovereignty under one or more of these rubrics. 
Conversely, Art. 534 is less about sexual morality than it is about upholding well-instilled gendered 
discourses. 
 
 
The “Reluctant Queer” 
 
The reluctant queer, I argued earlier, is best understood as a “stranger.” Precisely, the reluctant queer is 
made stranger to the hetero-patriarchal foundations of Lebanese nation-state. Their non-normative desire 
                                                 
4 For a reminder, the narrative of “saving Afghan women” figured prominently in the speeches of US politicians and 
influential personalities, including Laura Bush, in the weeks before the invasion of Afghanistan. This narrative 
brings forth the colonial pretext of “white men saving brown women from brown men,” as succinctly put by Gayatri 
Spivak. It has been criticized by an array of feminist scholars working on the Middle East, including Lila Abu-Lughod 
(2013). 
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16 constructs them as a stranger who is simultaneously alien to and betraying of the promises and premises 
of the Lebanese nation-state. That is, the Lebanese state constructs the nation by designating a 
commonly denominated Other who doubly defies its heterosexual conventions and the limits of the strict 
permissible parameters originally assigned to them. This is a considerable departure from Benedict 
Anderson’s conceptualization of the nation as an “imagined” space of commonality in spite of difference.  
 
At the same time, the Lebanese queer is immediately recognized, or must I say, made recognizable by 
the “Gay Internationalist” (see: Massad 2002). This recognition is a continuity of the colonial enterprise 
and the result of a mechanism of intense fetishizing that is premised on “eating the other” (hooks 1992). 
This “stranger fetishism,” as Sara Ahmed would conceive it, is abundant with the “orientalist” trope of 
“protecting the otherness of the other” (Ahmed 2000, 140) – not for the sake of recognizing their specificity, 
but to coerce them into a rhetoric of “needing saving” (see: Mikdashi 2011). This state of affairs is best 
captured by Meyda Yegenoglu (1998, 48), who states: 
 
In Western eyes, the Orient is always more and other than what it appears to be, for it always 
and everywhere appears in a veiled, disguised, and deceptive manner. It is by way of its veiled 
appearance, by the very act of its concealment, that the Orient reveals itself, reveals that there is 
Orient, a place, a culture, an essence that needs to be grasped, known, and apprehended. 
 
To fully comprehend the “stranger” and “stranger fetishism” dichotomy in the context of the reluctant 
queer, I situate the latter in relation to Art. 534. What emerges is a gap between mainstream media 
depictions of LGBT activism in Lebanon on the one hand, and the lived reality of its non-normative bodies 
on the other. To begin with, it is important to note that Lebanon’s heterosexual, non-heterosexual, 
homosexual, transsexual, and transgender population can be imprisoned under Article 534 of Lebanese 
Penal Code, which dictates that “any sexual intercourse contrary to nature leads to a sentence of prison 
up to one year” (see: Al-Farchichi and Saghiyeh 2012). 
 
The openness of the expression “act against nature” is evident in its application to cases of “moral crimes” 
devoid of sexual intercourse and in the non-conviction of same-sex practitioners in three cases since 
2009. Theoretically speaking, the ambiguity of Art. 534 brings forth the work of Kopano Ratele (2014), 
who distinguishes between “vertical” and “horizontal” homophobia. Whereas the first refers to elitist and 
legal narratives that “trickles down to people,” the second exists outside of confines of the judiciary sphere 
and is located at the level of society (Ratele 2014, 122). Ratele’s analysis compels us to acknowledge the 
mutli-layeredness of homophobia, and to take into consideration the ways in which state and society co-
constitute discourses of homophobia. Still, the boundaries between vertical and horizontal homophobia 
are not straightforward, particularly when we insert an intersectional layer to our analysis. 
 
The last ruling related to Art. 534 took place in July 2018, when an upper court upheld the ruling of a lower 
court’s acquittal of nine men put on trial for engaging in unnatural sex. Unsurprisingly, celebratory 
headlines in western-based news outlets soon followed, with many hastily stating that Lebanon was 
“closer to decriminalizing” Art. 534. Such stances echo the view of Anjali Arondekar (2016, 333) who, in 
her examination of the links between “geopolitics and sex,” sarcastically states: “After all, we [i.e. sexuality 
scholars] cannot not want the incommensurability of the ‘Rest’ [referring to the global south]!” 
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17 A large proportion of Lebanon’s self-identified LGBT population shows little interest in mobilizing against 
Art. 534 of the Lebanese legal penal code because they consider it a lesser concern compared to their 
kin and friends’ reactions, or to their reconciliation between societal and theological interpretations of 
same-sex desire as anti-religious – be it a Muslim or a Christian setting – and their faith. In addition, 
sociability and relationality to others is tightly linked to sect in the Lebanese context, and sects themselves 
are dispersed along more or less geographically precise locations. As a result, self-identified LGBT 
individuals have to invest considerable emotional labor, time, and money in order to maintain long-lasting 
relationships with each other. Such narratives resonate with those encountered in the collective Bareed 
Mista3jil (Meem 2009), and more recently in the work of Sofian Merabet, Queer Beirut (2015). As a result, 
Lebanon’s LGBT population’s overall view can be summarized in their prioritization of social consent over 
legal protection. Their ambiguous relationship with the law (vertical homophobia) and society (horizontal 
homophobia) largely reflects the current state of affairs that dictate the Lebanese state’s attitude towards 
homosexuality. 
 
Although Lebanese officials do not issue pro-LGBT statements per se, they do not categorically condone 
same-sex desire either. This “task” is relegated to the religious authorities. In order to understand this 
conundrum, it is important that I elaborate on Lebanon’s religion/state nexus. Makdissi (1996, 25) likens 
the 1943 National Act from which independence ensued to the legitimization of a “system of patronage 
and a division of spoils among the elites,” who sought to appease their majoritarian sectarian communities 
at the expense of further minorities, and in the name of “national unity” – a fictitious narrative at best and 
a mandatory one at worst, deemed imperative for nation-building in the immediate aftermath of 
independence. As a result, the state/religion nexus relegates a large chunk of the civic duties of the state 
to the realm of kinship, the primary location for “protection against the state” (Joseph 2000, 109), and is 
largely informed by religion-based personal status codes. When Mikdashi (2014) examined the situation 
of Lebanese citizens who opted to register their (heterosexual) marriage directly with the state by revoking 
their respective personal status codes, she informed us that they soon “found themselves unable to 
inherit, run for public office, or register their marriage certificate or their newborn children in the 
government registries” (Mikdashi 2014, 289). 
 
Conversely, it is the (decriminalization) of the state/religious nexus, rather than Art. 534, that is more likely 
to bring actual change. Whereas homonationalism as a barometer for a state’s civilization status pretends 
to safeguard LGBT rights, it remains oblivious to non-homosexual intimacies that are equally subjugated 
to statal and legal procedures. That is, the singling out of the “gay rhetoric” in homonationalist governance 
leads to the prioritization of a singular sexuality, i.e. “normal” homosexuality, at the expense of further 
sexualities that equally find themselves negotiating their legal relationship with the State in an increasingly 
transnationally-informed and neo-liberally globalized world. This is evident in Lebanon’s intensely 
commodified LGBT scene, to the extent it is wrongly homogenized as an “exception” among its Arab 
neighbors. 
 
Indeed, Ghassan Moussawi (2013) conceives “fractal Orientalism,” or “Orientalisms within the Orient,” in 
order to elucidate us on the not-really exceptional status of Beirut compared to the “rest” of Lebanon. 
Beirut’s LGBT-friendly image is characteristic of Lisa Duggan’s (2002) definition of homonormativity: 
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upholds and sustains them, while promising the possibility of a demobilized gay constituency and 
a privatized, depoliticized gay culture anchored in domesticity and consumption (Duggan 2002, 
179). 
 
Homonormativity is intrinsically linked to contemporary consumerist behaviours that reinforce neoliberal 
models of consumerism and movement. In other words, queer subjects are more likely to gain momentum 
in their capacity as consumers rather than advocates for social or political change. In Lebanon, this 
momentum is further slowed down by a complex piecing together of fragmented politics that can be traced 
back to its civil war days. This fragmentation is succinctly captured by Sofian Merabet (2014), whose 
immersed ethnography in Beirut’s multitude of “queer spaces” leads him to conceptualize a homosexual 
sphere – not a homosexual community – to describe Beirut’s gay population. Indeed, the intersections of 
class, geographical location, sect, and distinct homoerotic embodiments produce “hierarchies of urban 
mobility” (Merabet 2014, 74) that ultimately dictate one’s place and potential to access certain spaces, 
including activist ones. This point is further developed by Merabet (2014), who cautiously and humbly 
relates the recurring short livelihood of each of the initiatives undertaken by Lebanon’s LGBT activists 
throughout its recent history. 
 
Returning to Massad’s argument, and far from his global/local binary, LGBT activism in Lebanon 
simultaneously draws on “both local and global discourses of sexuality” (Moussawi 2015, 594). It is thus 
important to stress the heterogeneity of LGBT activism in Lebanon. Critical queer theorists increasingly 
caution us against the universalization of queer experience (Engebretsen 2013). Such an approach leaves 
unattended the complex differences between sexual identities within a particular collective (Gamson 
1995). Indeed, and unlike Massad’s “assimilationist” analysis, a small fraction of LGBT activists does 
conduct their politics through an intersectional and coalitional politics lens, by recognizing the 
entanglement of class, gender, sect, and sexuality in the context of local and transnational political 
mobilization, notably where the question of Palestine is concerned (Naber and Zaatari 2014).  
 
The collective Meem (2009), for instance, was clear in its rejection of the “coming out” narrative that we 
often encounter in liberal interpretations of LGBT activism; instead, it situates its politics within an Arab 
(as opposed to global) movement (Moussawi 2015, 605-606). Similarly, and writing on behalf of Helem 
and in response to Joseph Massad’s “Gay International” accusations, Ghassan Makarem (2011) insists 
that being funded by western donors does not negate the fact that Helem is very much a product of its 
own conditions. In the same vein, Makarem asserts the importance of recognizing the interlocking 
systems of oppression in the context of LGBT activism, and to adopt transnational solidarity as a strategy 
that allows it to partake in the “wider struggle for democracy” (Ibid.). Still, Makarem’s recommendation did 
not resonate with all LGBT activists, many of whom privileged an approach focused on identity politics, at 
the expense of an intersectional one (see: Moussawi 2015). On this note, the question of visibility 
oftentimes clashes with the masculinist and sexist patriarchy permeating LGBT activism in Lebanon, with 
queer women and feminine masculinities feeling considerably targeted and policed by their LGBT fellows 
(see: Shabby 2012; Rizk and Makarem 2015 respectively). 
 
Another constraint that LGBT politics face in Lebanon is the rampant NGO-ization. Following Islah Jad 
(2003, 44), NGO-ization reflects the rather elitist approach and character of international and local NGOs 
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activism in Palestine, it can be extended to further contexts. For many men and women in the Middle 
East, the “professional” language and structure adopted by NGOs is akin to an alien lexicon that is far 
removed from their lived reality. Moreover, Jad (2003, 44) highlights that NGOs’ reliance on international 
donors de-legitimizes the work of local activists who are often perceived as agents of the west by the 
larger society. 
 
 
Concluding Remarks on the “Reluctant Queer” 
 
It is important that we refrain from accusing the “reluctant queer” of being indifferent. Reluctance is not 
tantamount to indifference. Just as the “reluctant queer” has to navigate an array of homophobic locations, 
LGBT activists often find themselves caught between local and global hegemonies. The local activist’s 
eternally “doomed” situation is best captured by Lama Abu-Odeh (2015) who identifies a “subdued mode” 
of attack that charges the “activist of being the unwitting handmaiden of western imperialist projects,” 
including Massad’s “Gay International,” or “as a naïve participant in western discourses,” evident in their 
lack of “qualification and nuance,” and further “skirmishes.” 
 
If anything, the “reluctant queer” befits Sara Ahmed’s “willful subject” par excellence, where “to be 
identified as willful is to become a problem” (Ahmed 2014, 3) that needs solving, i.e. to be rehabilitated to 
perform accordingly. Imperialists and liberals’ universalist take on identities construct both the politics of 
the “reluctant queer” and their sexuality as “reluctant,” and thus in need of being enabled with the 
necessarily tools to become more assertive. At the same time, the “reluctant queer” brings forth the native 
dilemmas that Kaguro Macharia (2016) eloquently conveys. Taking on the task of the “complaining 
native,” (187) Macharia (2016) relates the “sense of deracination” that “overwhelms” (185) him: Is he the 
“sly native, the trickster native, the desiring native, the sage native, the agential native, the undeveloped 
native, the homosexual native, the queer native, the deracinated native?” (188). Ultimately, he draws his 
own resolution in the format of the “indifferent native” (Ibid.). However, his indifference is not a 
depoliticized stance per se, particularly when we situate it in a context as complex as Lebanon’s 
“consociational” political system. Following John Nagle (2018), Lebanon’s distinct power-sharing system 
among 18 sects, does “open up” a dialogical space between LGBT activists and the state (and by 
extension the religious authorities). This space, however, can only contain the main ethnic groups and is 
unlikely to cut-across them (Ibid.). Ultimately, it seems that the reluctant queer ought to undo their 
strangeness in their very milieu first and foremost. At the same time, their milieu must be examined 
following an inside-out approach where a queer analysis is re-oriented in line with the context of question, 
and not vice versa. This echoes Mikdashi and Puar’s (2016, 217) recent call “for a politics in queer theory 
that works to displace the United States as the prehensive force for everyone else’s future.”  
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